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INTRODUCTION

The Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation,1 a federally recognized Indian
tribe,2 wants to put land into trust for housing, cultural, governmental,
and agricultural purposes to ensure the tribe’s continued growth.3
Before 2009, under the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), which
provides that the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (“Secretary”) can place land into trust for Indians,4 the Secretary would likely
have considered the Yocha tribe’s request and any concerns the local
government may voice within thirty days’ notice of the Secretary’s decision to accept the request, before placing the land into trust.5 Today,
however, the Secretary must conduct a lengthy and costly, two-part
analysis before deciding whether to take Indian land into trust. Further, the Secretary cannot disregard the concerns of private citizens
who may have standing to dispute the placement of the land into
trust.6 Thus, tribes, like the Yocha, can no longer begin land development following the Secretary’s trust approval without concern that
courts may vacate the decision years later.7
In 2009, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri v.
Salazar8 reshaped almost eight decades of law developed under the
IRA.9 While the IRA empowers the Secretary to place land into trust
for Indians, it defines Indian as any person of Indian descent who is a
member of a recognized Indian tribe “now under federal jurisdiction.”10 In Carcieri, the Supreme Court interpreted now to mean “as
of the time of the IRA enactment,” which was June 18, 1934.11
Before Carcieri, the Secretary had approved requests for trust-acquisitions coming from any tribe federally recognized as of the time of
1. The tribe was originally named “Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians.” See Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 75 FED. REGISTER 60810,
60813 (2010), http://www.bia.gov/idc/groups/xofa/documents/document/idc012038.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Don Frances, Possible Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation tribal land expansion creates stir in Capay Valley, DAILY DEMOCRAT (Feb. 6, 2013, 9:38 PM), http://www.
dailydemocrat.com/news/ci_22535715/possible-yocha-dehe-wintun-nation-tribal-landexpansion.
4. 25 U.S.C.A. § 465 (West 2012).
5. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b).
6. See generally Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012).
7. Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 919 F. Supp. 2d 51, 82
(D.D.C. 2013).
8. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
9. See 25 U.S.C.A §§ 461–79 (West 2012).
10. § 479.
11. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395.
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the request.12 However, Carcieri now forces the Secretary to determine if a tribe was actually under federal jurisdiction as of the enactment of the IRA.13 But this temporary solution is “time-consuming
and costly” and does not address whether land already placed into
trust will remain secure for tribes.14
In the years following Carcieri, demands for a legislative fix have
reached a fever pitch, with many proposals to address the Secretary’s
authority in light of the Carcieri decision.15 However, many of these
proposals fail to address the major issue created by Carcieri—the status of tribal land already taken into trust.16 Since Carcieri, tribes have
faced litigation over lands put into trust because of a lack of proof
affirmatively showing that they were under federal jurisdiction as of
1934.17
The Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak18 emphasized this issue by giving private citizens standing to
dispute the Secretary’s decision to put land into trust in the first
place.19 Even more significantly, because private citizens do not claim
an interest in the Indian land itself, the Quiet Title Act does not apply.20 Thus, a private citizen may potentially have up to six years to
dispute the decision made by the Secretary, in stark contrast to the
usual thirty days for challenges by state and local authorities.21
Together, Carcieri and Patchak have hindered recent tribal efforts
to seek land security because these decisions make clear that the status of land already placed in trust is no longer secure.22 These decisions have opened the floodgates to litigation challenging the
12. Id. at 407–08.
13. Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, Statement before the
Senate Committee: Impact of Carcieri v. Salazar on Native Americans (Oct. 13, 2011),
http://www.doi.gov/ocl/hearings/112/CarcieriCrisis_101311.cfm (stating the “Department must examine whether each tribe seeking to have land acquired in trust under
the Indian Reorganization Act was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934.”).
14. Id.
15. See infra Part V–A of this Comment, including Howard L. Highland, A Regulatory Quick Fix for Carcieri v. Salazar: How the Department of Interior can Invoke an
Alternative Source of Existing Statutory Authority to Overcome an Adverse Judgment
Under the Chevron Doctrine, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 933, 935–36 (2011).
16. See generally id. at 935–37; Amanda D. Hettler, Beyond a Cacieri Fix: The
Need for Broader Reform of the Land-Into-Trust Process of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2011).
17. Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 919 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66
(D.D.C. 2013); New York v. Salazar, No. 6:08-CV-00644, 2012 WL 4364452, at *8
(N.D.N.Y Sept. 24, 2012).
18. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S.
Ct. 2199 (2012).
19. Id. at 2210–11.
20. Id. at 2211.
21. Id. at 2218 (the dissent acknowledging that the majority’s decision will allow
claims pursuant to the IRA to be brought within the APA’s six-year limitation, as
opposed to the previous thirty-day period).
22. Stand Up for California!, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 82.
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Secretary’s authority to place land into trust for tribes, forcing tribes
that rely on trust acquisitions for economic stability to prepare for
costly litigation.23
This Comment will review the history pertaining to the role real
property plays in Indian law policy and address the impact of recent
Supreme Court decisions on the ability of tribes to put land into trust.
Part II describes the history of the law governing Indian land up to,
and including, the Marshall Trilogy, and explains the relative concept
of tribal sovereignty. Part III reviews statutes governing Indian land
after the Marshall Trilogy, and details the legal history around the Indian Reorganization Act. Part IV of this Comment explores how the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions have impacted the Indian land-intotrust process and explains the specific problems created by Carcieri
and Patchak. Part V considers the proposed solutions to this impact,
including legislative bills introduced since Carcieri, and suggests that
the best solution to the uncertainty caused by Carcieri and Patchak, is
for Congress to pass new legislation that reaffirms the Secretary’s authority and expressly secures the land, once placed in trust, from future litigation.
II. LAWS GOVERNING INDIAN LAND PRIOR

TO

MARSHALL

American Indian law is a unique body of law that governs the special relationship and interaction between Indian tribes and the federal
government and, particularly, the status of Indian tribes and which
rules apply in any given situation.24 Tribal status is of particular import because it affects the inherent rights of tribal sovereignty, which
include the right to secure tribal development through land acquisitions.25 The following section sets out the framework under which
federal Indian law has developed.
A. Pre-Revolutionary War Tribal Sovereignty
Recognition of tribal sovereignty, in the territory that would become the United States, crystallized with the Proclamation of 1763,
when King George effectively established that treaties with tribes
were required to allow British settlement on native lands, in order to
reduce the threat presented by natives.26 The proclamation language
indicated that the British believed native lands belonged to the Crown
23. Id.; Salazar, 2012 WL 4364452, at *8.
24. WILLIAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 (5th ed. 2009).
25. Mary Jane Sheppard, Taking Indian Land Into Trust, 44 S.D. L. REV. 681, 682
(1999).
26. Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REV.
329, 329–30 (1989).
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but recognized that natives had certain rights to the land they
occupied.27
Before the Proclamation, the long history of violence between natives and settlers was caused primarily by one thing: the right to occupy land.28 During that time, local colonial governments managed
relations with Indian tribes and often interpreted a tribe’s right to occupy land to include only the land a tribe actively and regularly cultivated, allowing local colonial officials to dispose of hunting land as
they saw fit, without the need to negotiate with tribes.29 Furthermore,
local officials capitalized on Indian uprisings that came in response to
these unfair interpretations by obtaining Indian land through conquest, which was “presumably pursuant to a defensive, legitimate
war.”30
In 1664, the Crown assigned a royal commission to investigate complaints brought by Indians.31 Of note is the commission’s opinion of a
dispute between the Mohegan tribe and Connecticut colonials, in
1743, when the royal commission rejected the colonials’ attack on the
commission’s authority to hear the case and held that Indian tribes
“were distinct peoples subject neither to the laws of England nor of
colonial courts.”32 The commission held that such disputes were to be
resolved by the law of nations and were within the jurisdiction of the
royal commission.33
The Proclamation established a boundary line around Indian land
and required British subjects to obtain a special license from the
Crown before acquiring any Indian land.34 However, twenty years
later, following the Revolutionary War, Great Britain ceded the land
relating to the Proclamation to the United States.35
B. The United States Constitution’s Impact on Tribal Sovereignty
The federal government’s relationship with native tribes is mentioned three times in the United States Constitution.36 Specifically,
Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 explains that apportionment of representatives and taxes among the states excludes non-taxed Indians.37
In addition, Article I, Section 8, gives Congress the power to regulate
27. Id. at 368.
28. Id. at 354.
29. Id. at 333.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 334.
32. Id. at 335–36.
33. Id. at 336.
34. Id. at 356.
35. Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 206 F. Supp. 2d 448, 474 (W.D.N.Y.
2002).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 2.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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“Commerce with Indian tribes,” which it treats separately from states
and foreign nations.38 The third mention is in the Fourteenth Amendment, which amends the apportionment of representatives in Section
2 above.39
Not surprisingly, the federal government had to face the same
responsibility as the Crown to resolve disputes arising from the competing interests between tribes and local authorities.40 The federal
government adopted policies similar to the Proclamation in the Indian
Trade and Intercourse Acts, enacted from 1790 to 1834 in a series of
six acts, which regulated commerce between Indians and non-Indians
and prohibited the purchase of Indian land without the approval of
the federal government.41 But such prohibitions did not keep the
Proclamation line that distinguished Indian country secure because
the federal government signed treaties with the tribes to secure large
amounts of Indian land for non-Indians, and before long, Indian country dwindled drastically.42
C. The Marshall Trilogy Impact on Tribal Sovereignty
In what has been dubbed the Marshall Trilogy, the Supreme Court,
under Chief Justice John Marshall, decided three Indian cases over a
nine-year period.43 These three cases characterized tribes as “domestic dependent nations.”44 The Marshall Trilogy has “serve[d] as the
legal foundation for federal Indian policy”45 for many years and it
eventually led to the development of the Indian land-into-trust
process.46
In 1823, the plaintiff in Johnson v. McIntosh47 claimed title to land
under a purchase and conveyance from Indians, but the defendant
claimed title under a grant from the federal government.48 The Supreme Court held that titles to land under Indian conveyances were
not legally valid because Indians only had a right of occupancy.49 The
Court determined that the United States had actual sovereignty over
38. § 8, cl. 3.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
40. Clinton, supra note 26, at 364.
41. Id. at 369.
42. Nicholas A. Fromherz & Joseph W. Mead, Equal Standing with States: Tribal
Sovereignty and Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 130,
151–52 (2010).
43. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
44. Fromherz & Mead, supra note 42, at 156–57.
45. Id. at 155.
46. Id.
47. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543 (1823).
48. See id. at 543–44; Daniel G. Kelly, Jr., Indian Title: The Rights of American
Natives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
655, 657 (1975).
49. Kelly, supra note 48, at 657–58.
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the land; thus, the federal government could grant American citizens
land that the Indians still possessed.50
Later, in 1831, in the case Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Cherokee Nation sought to prevent the State of Georgia from removing the
tribe from the lands it occupied within the state.51 It was in this case
that Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, held that tribes
lacked the standing to sue as a foreign nation, in the constitutional
sense.52 Instead, tribes were “domestic dependent nations” and their
relationship to the federal government “resemble[d] that of a ward to
his guardian.”53 Thus, the Court lacked original jurisdiction to hear
the case.54
In the final case of the trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia,55 the Chief
Justice articulated the foundation of tribal sovereignty in the United
States, and he laid out the relationship between the tribes and the
states and the federal government.56 Here, the Court reversed the
conviction of a non-Indian missionary who had resided in Indian territory without a permit as required by state statute.57 The Court recognized “federal supremacy over Indian land,” and held that Georgia
laws “had no force within the Indian territory.”58 Marshall explained
that “Indian nations . . . retain[ed] their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil,”59 and that “only the federal government had the power to regulate tribes.”60
III.

LAWS GOVERNING INDIAN LAND AFTER MARSHALL

In 1871, Congress passed the Indian Appropriations Act,61 which
substituted statutes for treaties in governing the federal government’s
interaction with tribes, and which expressly stated that tribes would
not be recognized as independent nations.62 The government continued to struggle with the Marshall concept in regards to what rights
and responsibilities the states and federal government owed the tribes.
However, the Supreme Court established that Indian lands created a
boundary that protected Indians from state jurisdiction but restricted
constitutional benefits.63
50. Id. at 658; M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574, 587–588.
51. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831).
52. Id. at 20; Fromherz & Mead, supra note 42, at 156.
53. Fromherz & Mead, supra note 42, at 157; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
54. Kelly, supra note 48, at 662–63.
55. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
56. Id. at 555.
57. Kelly, supra note 48, at 659–60.
58. Id. at 660.
59. Fromherz & Mead, supra note 42, at 157 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559).
60. Id. at 158.
61. Id. at 163.
62. Id.
63. Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (holding that
the district court of Dakota lacked jurisdiction to convict Indian who committed mur-
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When the Supreme Court upheld the Indian Appropriations Act in
United States v. Kagama,64 in 1886, concluding that the federal government had the power to govern tribes through acts of Congress, this
reaffirmed the Court’s embrace of the Marshall view on tribal sovereignty.65 Congress was quick to utilize its newfound power as trustee
to enact statutes that affected Indian land.
A. Decimation of Indian Lands by Congressional Acts
The first act affecting Indian land was the General Allotment Act of
1887,66 also known as the Dawes Act,67 which parceled out reservation land and allotted the land to individual tribal members while selling any “surplus”68 land to non-Indians.69 Individual Indians who
received such allotments were made United States citizens after a period of “trust supervision, usually twenty-five years,” becoming subject to state law rather than federal law.70
In 1906, Congress amended the Dawes Act, with the Burke Act,
which gave the Secretary the power to remove land from trust before
the trust’s original expiration, if the Secretary declared the Indian
holders of the land had become “competent and capable of managing
[their] affairs.”71 In 1910, Congress enacted “An Act to Provide for
Determining the Heirs of Deceased Indians, for the Disposition and
Sale of Allotments of Deceased Indians, for the Leasing of Allotments, and for Other Purposes,”72 which arguably superseded section
1 of the Dawes Act,73 by empowering the Secretary to sell the land if
der against another Indian within Indian territory); see also U.S. v. McBratney, 104
U.S. 621, 624 (1881) (holding district of Colorado lacks jurisdiction of non-Indian who
murders another non-Indian within the boundaries of Indian reservation land); see
also Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that notwithstanding a statute or
treaty stating otherwise, Indians are not born a citizen of the U.S.; thus, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments do not apply).
64. U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 375 (1886).
65. Id. at 380, 382 (stating “perhaps the best statement of [the Indians’] position is
found in the two opinions of this court by Chief Justice Marshall”).
66. Brief for Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians in Support of
Defendants-Appellees at 3, Carcieri v. Salazar, 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (No. 032647), 2004 WL 5568228.
67. Id.; Hettler, supra note 16, at 1383.
68. Clinton, supra note 26, at 375 (describing surplus land as “land not needed for
fixed-acreage allotments”).
69. Hettler, supra note 16, at 1383–84; see also Clinton, supra note 26, at 375 (stating “Indian land base shrank from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres in
1932.”).
70. Clinton, supra note 26, at 375; 25 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2012).
71. Cass County, Minn. v. Leach Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103,
103 (1998) (the Burke Act amended § 6 of the General Allotment Act).
72. The full name of the Act is the Native American Document Project, NADP
Document A1910, http://public.csusm.edu/nadp/a1910.htm.
73. Jordan v. O’Brien, 9 N.W.2d 146, 148 (S.D. 1943).
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he determined that any one of the allottee’s heirs was incompetent.74
A total of 118 Indian reservations were subject to the allotment process, which ultimately resulted in the loss of approximately two-thirds
of Indian land.75
In United States v. Sandoval,76 the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s exclusive power to regulate and exercise the care and protection of Indian tribes.77 The Court held that once Congress had begun
to act as guardian of the tribes, it was up to Congress and not the
courts to determine when the state of wardship would end.78
B. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
In 1934, the Bureau of Indian Affairs director, John Collier, championed Indian rights by introducing the Indian New Deal to promote
the revitalization of Indian culture and self-governance.79 The IRA
was the centerpiece of the Indian New Deal,80 it prohibited new allotments of land, it extended the trust period for existing allotments, and
it empowered the Secretary to take action to further protect Indian
land interests.81
To further these goals, section 3 of the IRA authorized, but did not
require,82 the Secretary to restore the surplus lands that “remained in
the hands of the United States” to tribal ownership.83 Section 4 provided that the Secretary “may authorize voluntary exchanges of land
of equal value,”84 allowing the conveyance of restricted Indian land
between Indians and non-Indians, but only with the Secretary’s approval.85 And section 5 of the IRA gave the Secretary express authorization to acquire land “for the purpose of providing land for
Indians.”86 Section 5 provided the “title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act . . . shall be taken . . . in trust for the
Indian tribe or individual Indian.”87 Once in trust, the land was not
74. NATIVE AMERICAN DOCUMENT PROJECT, NADP DOCUMENT A1910, 855–56,
http://public.csusm.edu/nadp/a1910.htm.
75. Peter Scott Vicaire, Two Roads Diverged in a Wood: A Comparative Analysis
of Indigenous Rights in North American Constitutional Context, 50 JUDGES’ J. 18, 20
(2011).
76. U.S. v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
77. Id. at 46.
78. Id.
79. G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, the Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri “Fix”: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 582 (2009).
80. Id. at 579–80.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 580–81 (citing Hinton v. Udall, 364 F.2d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 581.
85. Id. at 581–82.
86. 25 U.S.C.A § 465.
87. Id.
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subject to state laws, including state taxes.88 Further, land held in
trust could not be sold without an Act of Congress.89
Thus, the IRA effectively gave tribes an opportunity for stability in
occupying and using land, in contrast to the years of decimation of
tribal land ownership under the general allotment period. But it also
resulted in a conflict of interest between tribes and states.90 Tribes
had one year to accept or reject the IRA.91
C. Further Development of the Law Prior to 2009
In the years following the IRA, case law developed to form the
boundaries of tribal sovereignty and Indian rights to land; a boundary
that would remain ill defined for years to come. In 1959, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in an Arizona case,92 deciding the issue of
whether a non-Indian, who operated a general store on an Indian reservation, could sue an Indian to recover the cost for goods sold to the
Indian.93 The Court reversed the Arizona court’s ruling, holding that
the tribal court had jurisdiction to handle the case and that only Congress could take the authority away from the tribe.94
However, Congress’s responsibility to tribes remained unclear in
1968, when the Menominee tribe sought to hold the United States accountable for “destroying property rights conferred by treaty.”95 The
Supreme Court denied the tribe compensation, holding that the tribe
retained special hunting and fishing rights and that the tribe remained
immune from the state’s regulation.96 The dissent accurately highlighted the tribe’s formal termination and pointed to the statute’s
plain language, which was that upon termination “the laws of the several States shall apply to the tribe and its members.”97
In contrast, two years later, the Supreme Court upheld a tribe’s
mineral interest in the Arkansas River bed because the United States
had promised by treaty “no part of the land granted should ever be
embraced in any territory or state.”98 And in 1978, the Court affirmed
that while Indian nations were sovereign, their sovereignty was limited and subject to the whim of Congress.99 It specifically held that
only Congress had the power to completely invalidate the sovereignty
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Sheppard, supra note 25, at 682.
Id.
25 U.S.C.A. § 478.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 217 (1959).
Id. at 217–18.
Id. at 223.
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
Id. at 414.
Id.
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 625 (1970).
U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
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of the Indian nation.100 Two years later, the Court held that tribal
sovereignty was dependent on the federal government, not the
states.101 And in 1990, the Court held that tribes have the power to
exclude people from tribal lands,102 once again acknowledging tribes
as sovereign nations apart from states, but subject to federal law.103
Congress clarified the relationship between the federal government
and the tribes, and tribal land rights, by enacting several more statutes. In 1972, Congress enacted the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”),104 a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for disputes regarding real property
interests adverse to the United States, but it excluded Indian trust
lands from the waiver.105 In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land
Consolidation Act (“ILCA”)106 in an effort to assist tribes with reacquiring their land base.107 In 1994, Congress added two subsections to
the IRA with the purpose of eliminating distinctions between federally recognized tribes regarding privileges and immunities available to
the Indian tribe.108
Although the Supreme Court considered tribes sovereign nations,
the federal government had the power to decide what that sovereignty
meant.109 While tribal governments had broad power to adopt and
govern their own affairs within Indian land,110 laws adopted by the
tribes had to pass the review of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”),
a department within the Department of the Interior (“DOI”).
IV. RECENT SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION
AS IT PERTAINS TO TRUSTS

OF

INDIAN LAW

Initially, courts affirmed the view that only the federal government
had the power to govern tribes, not states.111 Over time, the courts
continued to reduce tribes’ sovereign authority, giving even more au100. Id.
101. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 154 (1980).
102. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990).
103. Id.
104. QTA is codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2409a (West 2012).
105. 28 U.S.C.A § 2409a; 28 U.S.C.A. § 2409(a); Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702,
712 (D.C.C.C. 2011) (stating that the QTA “reflects a congressional policy of honoring the fed government’s solemn obligations to Indians”).
106. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2202–03 (2006).
107. §§ 2202–2204; see flyer, available at http://www.law.seattleu.edu/documents/
indian-institute/doiindianlandconsolidact.pdf (ILCA focuses on acquiring fractionated
land through purchase and then transfer of the deed to the tribe.).
108. Brief for Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians in Support of
Defendants-Appellees at 17–18, Carcieri v. Salazar, 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (No.
03-2647), 2004 WL 5568228.
109. See U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
110. U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886).
111. Id. at 380.
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thority to the federal government,112 which has led to recent cases affecting Indian land trust acquisitions.
A. Key Cases
1. Carcieri v. Salazar
In 2009, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the IRA in Carcieri
v. Salazar substantially shifted the stability that trust-status had
brought to tribes.113 The Court interpreted the IRA’s definition of
Indian as limited to only those tribes “now under federal jurisdiction.”114 Specifically, the Court held the tribe had to be under federal
jurisdiction as of the time of the enactment of the Act in 1934,115 in
stark contrast to the decades of interpretation by both the Secretary
and Congress.116
The Carcieri issue arose in 1992, when the Narragansett tribe of
Rhode Island obtained thirty-one acres of land “for the purpose of
constructing low-income housing for tribal members,”117 and the
question of whether the land would be subject to local regulations became relevant.118 In response, the tribe asked the Secretary to place
the land into trust.119 The Secretary approved the request, and the
federal district court affirmed it,120 but Rhode Island121 appealed the
district court’s ruling, claiming section 5 of the IRA was “an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.”122
In 1983, the Narragansetts had become a federally recognized tribe,
and, five years later, the Secretary placed the 1,800 acres of land into
trust for the tribe.123 However, the thirty-one acres at issue in Carcieri
were not a part of the 1,800 trusted acres, but were “separated from
those lands only by a Town road.”124
112. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family, 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
113. Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 919 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66
(D.D.C. 2013); New York v. Salazar, No. 6:08-CV-00644, 2012 WL 4364452, at *8
(N.D.N.Y Sept. 24, 2012).
114. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 394.
115. Id.
116. U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 391.
117. Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 3, Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379
(2009) (No. 07-526), 2008 WL 225448.
118. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385.
119. Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 4, Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379
(2009) (No. 07-526), 2008 WL 225448.
120. Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D.R.I. 2003).
121. All parties opposing the Secretary’s decision are hereinafter referred to as
Rhode Island.
122. Brief for Respondents in Opposition at I., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379
(2009) (No. 07-526), 2008 WL 225448.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Brief for the Federal Appellees at 8, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15 (1st
Cir. 2007) (No. 03-2647), 2004 WL 5568225.
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On appeal to the First Circuit, Rhode Island insisted that the Secretary had always interpreted the word now, in the IRA’s Indian definition, to mean when the IRA was enacted in 1934,125 and, thus, only
tribes that were both federally recognized and under federal jurisdiction at that time were subject to the benefits of the IRA.126 Rhode
Island insisted that it was not until the 1970s that the Secretary began
to place land into trust for tribes, who did not meet the IRA criteria,
but that Congress specifically authorized these individual acquisitions
outside the IRA authority.127
The Secretary responded that the Narragansetts were a federally
recognized tribe, as evidenced by the tribe’s continued existence since
at least the 1600s, and as such the tribe was entitled to the benefits of
the IRA.128 Further, the Secretary insisted that the IRA did not require tribes to be both federally recognized and under federal jurisdiction in 1934.129 The National Congress of American Indians,
Individual Indian Tribes, and Tribal Organizations (“National Congress”) wrote a brief for amici curiae in support of the Secretary’s
decision to place the Narragansett tribe’s land into trust.130 In its
brief, the National Congress argued that the term now referred to the
“moment when the Secretary exercises her statutory authority,”131
and it provided several case examples showing that now did not refer
to statutory enactment but to the time the prescribed action took
place.132
In January 2007, the First Circuit heard the case en banc.133 Six
months later, the majority affirmed the district court’s findings and
held that the term now was ambiguous; thus, the Secretary had authority, under the Chevron doctrine,134 to interpret the word’s meaning within the IRA.135 Rhode Island petitioned for, and the Supreme
Court granted, certiorari on the issue.136
125. State Appellant’s Response to Amici Curiae at 1, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497
F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (No. 03-2647), 2005 WL 6119903.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id.
128. Brief for the Federal Appellees at 12, Carcieri v. Salazar, 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.
2007) (No. 03-2647), 2004 WL 5568228.
129. State Appellant’s Response to Amici Curiae at 6, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497
F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (No. 03-2647), 2005 WL 6119903.
130. Brief for Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians in Support of
Defendants-Appellees at *15, Carcieri v. Salazar, 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (No. 032647), 2004 WL 5568228 (stating the Secretary’s trust authority extends to the Narragansett tribe).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, 15 (1st Cir. 2007).
134. Highland, supra note 15, at 939–40.
135. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d at 22.
136. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009)
(No. 07-526), 2007 WL 3085107.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\1-2\TWR207.txt

306

unknown

Seq: 14

TEXAS A&M J. OF REAL PROPERTY LAW

27-NOV-13

9:48

[Vol. 1

In the Supreme Court hearing, the Secretary protested the State’s
continued claims, contending that the Secretary had authority to take
land into trust for a currently recognized tribe, and that the IRA defines tribe differently than Indian.137 The IRA defines tribe as “any
Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one
reservation,”138 but it does not include the phrase “now under federal
jurisdiction,” as used to define Indian.139
During oral arguments, the Supreme Court’s focus was on the term
now, and whether it restricted the trust benefits of the IRA to a “finite
group.”140 Specifically, counsel for Rhode Island argued that the definition of Indian modified the definition of tribe because tribe referred
to an Indian tribe.141 Further, counsel argued that the IRA was a limited, remedial policy intended to compensate the Indians who were
affected by the general allotment period.142 Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the majority, found Rhode Island’s counsel’s “backwardlooking perspective . . . to make perfect sense.”143
In its opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that the IRA authorized the Secretary to take land into trust “for the purpose of providing
land for Indians,”144 but that Indian meant Indians “who are members
of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.”145
The Court applied principles of statutory construction to determine
whether now, as used in the statute, was ambiguous.146 This was an
important question, because if the statute was ambiguous, then the
Court would be required to give deference to the Secretary’s
interpretation.147
The Court held, according to the statute, that the word now was
unambiguous and limited the word Indian.148 It therefore concluded
that the statutory language limited the Secretary’s authority to take
land into trust.149 Perhaps of greater consequence to the tribe was the
Court’s holding that the Secretary’s failure to refute Rhode Island’s
claim that the Narragansett tribe “was neither federally recognized
nor under [federal] jurisdiction”150 in 1934 was reason alone to deter137. Brief for the Respondents at 12, Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (No.
07-526), 2008 WL 3883433.
138. 25 U.S.C.A. § 479 (West 2012).
139. Id.
140. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–4, 14–15, Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379
(2009) (No. 07-526).
141. Id. at 23.
142. Id. at 8.
143. Id. at 39.
144. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 381–82 (2009) (citing 25 U.S.C.A § 465).
145. Id. at 388.
146. Id. at 387.
147. Highland, supra note 15, at 939–40.
148. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 391.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 395–96.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\1-2\TWR207.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 15

CAN I KEEP MY TIPI HERE?

27-NOV-13

9:48

307

mine the Secretary lacked the authority to take the thirty-one acres
into trust.151
Immediate outcries to restore the tribes’ security of trust-acquisitions were made, but, just three years later, the Court would further
undermine tribal efforts for land stability.
2. Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak
In June 2012, the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians v. Patchak Court clarified that the QTA did not prevent
courts from removing tribal land from trust if the claimant holds no
interest in the land, even if the challenge comes many years after its
placement into trust.152 Before Patchak, state and local governments
were given notice when the Secretary was considering whether to put
land into trust, and they had thirty days to file disputes of the acquisition with the DOI.153 The Secretary would then put the acquisition on
hold and take any disagreement to court.154 Patchak opens the door
to reversing trust acquisitions years after the court resolved potential
disagreements.
Patchak involved a dispute regarding the Secretary’s decision to
take land into trust for the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (“Band”), also known as the Gun Lake Band.155
The Secretary federally recognized the Band as an Indian tribe in
1999.156 In 2001, the Band asked the Secretary to take a parcel of land
into trust, but a non-profit organization challenged this request.157
After the district court rejected the organization’s challenge, David
Patchak, a resident of the township where the parcel of land was located, filed suit opposing the Secretary’s decision, more than three
years after the Secretary’s notice was given about putting the Band’s
land into trust.158
In Patchak’s brief to the District of Columbia Circuit, his chief concern involved the tribe’s proposed plans for the land, which included a
gambling complex.159 He argued that his three-year delay in filing suit
was reasonable because it came in response to the Supreme Court’s
151. Id. at 396.
152. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S.
Ct. 2199 (2012); Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian Cmty. v.
Salazar, No. 2:12-CV-3021-JAM-AC, 2013 WL 417813, at *8 (holding that Patchak
indicated courts “do have the power to strip the federal government of title to land
taken into trust . . . as long as the claimant does not assert an interest in the land.”)
153. Id. at 2203.
154. Cachil Dehe Band, 2013 WL 417813, at *1–2.
155. Brief for Respondent David Patchak at 1, Patchak v. Salazar, 132 S. Ct. 2199
(2012) (Nos. 11–246, 11–247), 2011 WL 5548714.
156. Id. at 2.
157. Id. at 3.
158. Id. at 5.
159. Appellant’s Corrected Final Reply Brief at 2, Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 09-5324), 2010 WL 4569094.
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decision to grant certiorari in Carcieri, and that the grant gave notice
to both the Secretary and the Band that the Band may be “ineligible
for an IRA land-in-trust acquisition.”160 Patchak maintained that his
suit was not barred because the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) waived the DOI’s sovereign immunity.161 Under the APA,
the court had authority to set aside an agency’s decision if “the
agency’s actions were not in accordance with law.”162 He claimed that
the Band was not a federally recognized Indian tribe in 1934 and that
he had an interest in enforcing the prescribed limit of eligible tribes
under the IRA’s land-in-trust acquisition; thus, he had prudential
standing.163
Unsurprisingly, the Secretary agreed with the district court’s finding
that Patchak lacked prudential standing.164 The Secretary maintained
that the APA did not apply to the case because the QTA expressly
forbade the relief Patchak sought.165 The Secretary had already decided to take the land into trust before Patchak’s suit.166 The QTA
“enacted a limited waiver of sovereign immunity [that] allow[ed] parties claiming title to real property adverse”167 to the federal government, but it excluded claims that sought to divest the federal
government’s title to Indian trust lands.168 The Secretary insisted the
thirty days following the announcement to take the land into trust was
the appropriate period of time that Patchak should have filed his
suit.169
The circuit court agreed that Patchak had prudential standing and
held that he also had Article III standing because the proposed casino’s impact on his quality of life would be an “injury-in-fact fairly
traceable to the Secretary’s fee-to-trust decision.”170 The circuit court
also held that the QTA’s exclusion did not apply because Patchak’s
suit was not the sort of action applicable under the Act.171 The court
reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari at the Secretary’s request.172
160. Id. at 17–18.
161. Id. at 9–10.
162. New York v. Salazar, No. 6:08-CV-00644, 2012 WL 4364452, at *7 (N.D.N.Y
Sept. 24, 2012) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
163. Appellant’s Corrected Final Reply Brief at 5–6, Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d
702 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 09-5324), 2010 WL 4569094.
164. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees (Final Brief) at 20, Patchak v.
Salazar, 632 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 09-5324), 2010 WL 4569092.
165. Id. at 21–22.
166. Id. at 12.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 15–16, (the land had already been taken into trust by this point in the
proceedings).
170. Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 704 (2011).
171. Id. at 708.
172. Id. at 712–13.
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Hearing much of the same arguments as the lower courts, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling and explained that
there was a distinction between Patchak’s claim and a QTA claim in
that Patchak was not claiming an actual interest in the land.173 The
Court held that the QTA provisions did not apply in Patchak’s case
and that until Congress made a QTA-like judgment for suits like
Patchak’s, cases like his would fall “within the APA’s general waiver
of sovereign immunity.”174
Following Patchak, litigation arose in courts that relied on Patchak
standing grounds and on the Carcieri limits on the IRA.175
3. New York v. Salazar
Just three months after Patchak, a federal district court in New
York consolidated several motions for summary judgment regarding
the Secretary’s decision to take land into trust.176 The plaintiffs in five
separate but related cases, ranging from the State of New York to
New York residents, filed suits to dispute the Secretary’s 2008 decision
to place 13,000 acres of land into trust for the Oneida Indian Nation of
New York (“OIN”).177 Over time, the OIN had purchased the land at
full market value;178 this was land that had previously been lost
through agreements with the State.179 The tribe acquired over 17,000
acres, 13,000 of which the Secretary approved to be placed into
trust.180
On the heels of Carcieri, the New York v. Salazar plaintiffs filed suit
alleging that the OIN was not a federally recognized tribe and was not
under federal jurisdiction in 1934.181 Further, the plaintiffs claimed
that the land itself did not qualify for the IRA trust acquisition because the land had not been subject to the General Allotment Act,
and that the Secretary’s application of the IRA violated the Tenth
Amendment.182
173. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S.
Ct. 2199, 2206 (2012).
174. Id. at 2207, 2210.
175. Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian Cmty. v. Salazar, No.
2:12-CV-3021-JAM-AC, 2013 WL 417813, *2–4 (explaining that the plaintiffs opposed
Secretary’s acquisition of land pursuant to the IRA and do not claim an interest in the
land); New York v. Salazar, No. 6:08-CV-00644, 2012 WL 4364452, at *5, *8 (N.D.N.Y
Sept. 24, 2012) (discussing the plaintiffs’ claim that the IRA did not apply to the
OIN).
176. Salazar, 2012 WL 4364452, at *1.
177. Id.
178. Brief in opposition at 8, Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New
York, 2013 WL 205941 (U.S.).
179. Id. at 5.
180. Salazar, 2012 WL 4364452, at *1.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *3, *5.
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In determining whether summary judgment was appropriate, the
district court considered the issue of whether the IRA applied to the
OIN.183 Unlike the Carcieri court, this court did not make the final
determination of the tribe’s 1994 status.184 Instead, amidst strong arguments by both parties to the contrary, the district court remanded
the case to the Secretary for additional investigation or explanation,185
after determining that the Secretary had released his Record of Decision (“ROD”) on the case prior to the Carcieri decision, and it lacked
an analysis regarding the Carcieri issue.186 Both parties expressed the
futility of remanding the case to the Secretary for further analysis and
agreed that the court should determine whether the tribe was under
federal jurisdiction, as a matter of law, based on the facts provided by
the parties.187 But the court decided that it lacked the expertise to
make such an analysis, instead expounding on the Secretary’s expertise and special skills in making this determination.188
New York v. Salazar highlights the continued potential suits
brought by numerous plaintiffs with Patchak standing, not only regarding the Secretary’s authority to place Indian land into trust, but
also regarding whether the Secretary’s process for determining
whether a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 should be subject to judicial review in each case.189
B. The Effect on the Trust-Acquisition Process Under the IRA
1. Impact on Trust Status
Before Carcieri and Patchak, the Indian land-to-trust process under
the IRA had developed into a system that took place in three general
steps.190 In the first step, after a federally recognized tribe requested
the Secretary to take Indian owned land into trust, the Secretary considered several factors, including: (1) the tribe’s need for additional
land; (2) how the tribe would use the land; (3) the acquisition’s impact
on the state and local government; and (4) the location of the land in
relation to state boundaries.191 When requested land is farther away
from the boundaries of a tribe’s reservation, the Secretary would give
greater scrutiny to the request.192
183. Id. at *8.
184. Id. at *15.
185. Id. at *11.
186. Id. at *14.
187. Id. at *12.
188. Id. at *11.
189. See Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 919 F. Supp. 2d 51,
82 (D.D.C. 2013).
190. This is the Author’s three-step generalization of the process based on the following case cites.
191. Stand Up for California!, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
192. Sheppard, supra note 25, at 685–86.
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In the second step, the Secretary would announce his decision after
an extensive administrative review.193 If the Secretary approved the
request, the announcement notified state and local governments that
they had a thirty-day period to provide written comments relating to
the proposed acquisition. During this time, the Secretary voluntarily
stayed the decision past the thirty-day window to put the land into
trust until any disputes were resolved,194 sometimes forcing tribes to
wait years before land could be secure.
Finally, in the third step, notwithstanding judicial determinations to
the contrary, the Secretary formally accepted the land into trust and
tribes began following through on their plans for the land, reaping the
benefits of trust-status security.
Carcieri affected the first step in this process. When a tribe requests
that land be taken into trust under the IRA, the Secretary will have to
determine whether the tribe is subject to the IRA.195 This is a factintensive process, which can take a great amount of time and money
from both the BIA and the tribes. Even when the Secretary determines the tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the Secretary
faces the hurdle of litigation in the second step.196
Patchak affects steps two and three of the process; thus, propelling
the Secretary to alter the second step.197 The Secretary no longer follows the self-imposed stay, because the purpose of the thirty-day notice, and taking disputes to the courts, was to allow judicial review
before transferring the title to the federal government due to the interpretation that the QTA prevented such a review once title was
transferred.198 After Patchak, this concern is no longer relevant because the Patchak court suggested that courts could vacate trust transfers after the land has been placed into trust.199
Subsequently, the third step, transferring the land into trust, can
happen quickly once the Secretary makes the decision to accept the
land.200 However, tribes may find it more difficult to secure financing
to begin building on the land, even after the trust transfer, because the
193. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Patchak v. Salazar, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012)
(No. 11-247), 2011 WL 3780730.
194. Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian Cmty. v. Salazar, No.
2:12-CV-3021-JAM-AC, 2013 WL 417813, at *2.
195. New York, 2012 WL 4364452, at *9 (plaintiffs urged the court to consider several factors to determine whether the tribe is subject to the IRA based on Carcieri
reasoning); see generally Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
196. Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian Cmty. v. Salazar, No.
2:12-CV-3021-JAM-AC, 2013 WL 417813, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013).
197. Stand Up for California!, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 60–61 (“BIA no longer following
its self-stay procedure because . . . [Patchak] held that the [QTA] no longer bars
challenges.”).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 82 (“Patchak court suggested . . . that courts would retain jurisdiction to
vacate a trust after it is consummated.”).
200. Id.
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previous trust security may take years after the transfer to bring to
fruition.201
2. Federal Recognition Pertaining to the IRA
Resolving the Supreme Court defined limits under the IRA are not
so easy because federal recognition has its own history. Early on, federal recognition was given to the tribes that the federal government
had a relationship with and those tribes that were allowed to organize
pursuant to the IRA.202 The DOI did not develop a uniform process
for determining federal recognition of a tribe until 1978.203 Thus, the
reliability of the process between 1934 and 1978 is questionable, which
has been demonstrated by the Secretary’s acknowledgment that there
were tribes that had been previously recognized by the federal government but had been ignored while the BIA went through organizational changes in the past.204 Thus, after the passage of the IRA, there
were acknowledged tribes with limited legal rights that were not federally recognized until much later.205
Less than forty years later, the federal government terminated the
wardship of several tribes because the tribes were found to be capable
of self-government and no longer in need of federal supervision.206
The loss of federal recognition led to the losses of tribal land once
again for many tribes whose relationships were terminated with the
federal government under this policy.207 Only Congress can terminate
the federal recognition of a tribe or restore recognition to a terminated tribe.208
In 1978, Congress gave the Secretary the power to recognize federal
groups possessing sovereign authority, and eligibility for federal services.209 The criteria for federal recognition was created by the DOI,
not by statute,210 and federal recognition required:
(1) a tribe must have been identified as an American Indian entity
since 1900; (2) it must comprise a distinct community and have existed as a community from historical times; (3) it must have political
influence over its members; (4) it must have membership criteria;
and (5) it must have a membership that consists of individuals who
201. Stand Up for California!, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
202. Margo S. Brownell, Who is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question
at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 301 (2001).
203. Answering Brief of Appellees at 5, Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 813 F.
Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 11-5328) 2012 WL 2675361.
204. Brief of Appellant Muwekma Ohlone Tribe at 13, Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v.
Salazar, 813 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 11-5328) 2012 WL 2675362.
205. Id.
206. Brownell, supra note 202, at 303.
207. Id.
208. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
209. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2.
210. Brownell, supra note 202, at 301.
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descend from a historical Indian tribe and who are not enrolled in
any other tribe.211

Since then, Congress enacted the Federally Recognized Indian
Tribe List Act (“Act”) in 1994.212 The Act required the Secretary to
keep a list of all federally recognized tribes that were eligible for programs and services provided by the federal government based on their
Indian status.213 However, the list has never included the date the
tribe became federally recognized.214 Before Carcieri, this distinction
may have meant little, but now, it is the critical issue in litigation regarding trust acquisitions under the IRA. One court described federal
recognition as “recognition of a previously existing status,”215 which
supports the first factor the DOI considers in its process.
But the Secretary must now develop a process for what it means to
be under federal jurisdiction in 1934. In one case, the Secretary has
argued that if a tribe was given the option to vote on accepting the
IRA in 1934 then the tribe was under federal jurisdiction at that time,
regardless of whether the tribe voted against accepting the IRA.216
Additionally, the Secretary has held out treaties that were in effect in
1934 as examples of a relationship between the government and the
tribe for purposes of the IRA.217 But whether these factors will be
upheld as a reasonable means for determining what under federal jurisdiction means for the IRA is for the courts to decide.
V. SOLVING

THE

TRUST-STATUS ISSUE

Since the Carcieri decision, there have been calls for various
Carcieri fixes, but these solutions fail to consider the full impact recent
cases have made on the land-to-trust acquisition process.
A. Proposed Solutions
1. Agency Fix
Howard L. Highland has suggested using the Chevron doctrine to
solve Carcieri’s adverse effects.218 Specifically, Highland suggested
211. Id. at 302 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (a)-(f)).
212. Brief for the Federal Appellees at 15, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15 (1st
Cir. 2007) (No. 03-2647), 2004 WL 5568225.
213. Id.
214. Brief for Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians, Individual Indian Tribes, and Tribal Organizations in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 19,
Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F. 3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (No. 03-2647), 2004 WL 5568228.
215. Brief for Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians, Individual Indian Tribes, and Tribal Organizations in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 13,
Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F. 3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (No. 03-2647), 2004 WL 5568228
(citing Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 694 (1st Cir. 1994)).
216. New York v. Salazar, No. 6:08-CV-00644, 2012 WL 4364452, at *10 (N.D.N.Y
Sept. 24, 2012).
217. Id. at 11.
218. Highland, supra note 15, at 933.
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that the Secretary should use the explicit delegation from alternative
statutes to create regulations that fill the gap left by Congress to provide lands for Indians who were not under federal jurisdiction in
1934.219 Highland relies on the fact that numerous statutes authorize
the Secretary’s trust acquisitions; thus, this solution would be quicker
than waiting for “new regulations or to await corrective legislation.”220
New York v. Salazar supports Highland’s premise that courts would
affirm the Secretary’s future decisions based on agency deference, but
Carcieri provides little security that the Supreme Court will put as
much weight in agency deference when it comes to statutory interpretation.221 More importantly, Highland’s solution does not prevent private citizens with prudential standing to file suits requesting courts to
vacate trust transfers.222
2. Legislative Fix
Amanda D. Hettler pontificates that Carcieri created a “historic opportunity” for lawmakers to reform the entire land-to-trust process.223
She expresses the inadequacies of the current process by relying on
the little weight given to state and local governments.224 She suggests
the reform should effectively balance tribal and state interests, and
that the Secretary’s wide discretion should be remedied.225 To further
this goal, Hettler urges Congress to define “which lands may be taken
into trust and for what purposes.”226 Additionally, she urges
lawmakers to give clear guidance to the Secretary regarding “the relative weight the competing interests should have in the process.”227
Her proposed solution includes requiring the Secretary to give state
and local governments more than thirty days to express their
concerns.228
Hettler’s solution fails to give the appropriate weight to the policy
underlining the IRA and other federal Indian law statutes enacted
since 1934. She considers the IRA in the same way Justice Roberts
does; the backward-looking perspective makes perfect sense.229 But
tribal sovereignty requires certain duties and obligations on the part
of the federal government until Congress determines that the relation219. Id. at 944–45.
220. Id. at 942.
221. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (interpreting the word “now” to be
unambiguous, rejecting the Secretary’s interpretation).
222. Highland’s review understandably does not account for the implications of
Patchak, as Patchak was released a year following Highland’s review.
223. Hettler, supra note 16, at 1377.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1399.
226. Id. at 1399.
227. Id. at 1399–1400.
228. Id. at 1392, 1400.
229. Id. at 1402 (stating to “ensure that the [IRA] does not become [a program]
that persists long after its purpose has been accomplished”).
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ship is at an end. Accepting land into trust for tribes is a part of the
federal government’s duty to protect tribes and affirm their sovereignty. If Congress were to follow Hettler’s suggestions, the IRA
would be at odds with other federal Indian laws.
G. William Rice recognized Carcieri has, or will, create a problem
for hundreds of tribes that have placed land into trust, and will result
in unending litigation regarding whether a tribe, on a case-by-case basis, falls within the terms of the IRA.230 Rice proposed a two-part
Carcieri fix.231 The first part would be to allow all tribes to acquire
lands as federally incorporated tribes; allowing the tribes to purchase
and manage lands like other federally chartered organizations and
subject the lands to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government and the tribe.232 The second part simply purports to clean up
the problematic language of the IRA.233
Like Highland’s proposed solutions, Rice fails to consider the
Patchak implications. In light of Patchak, a Carcieri fix must come
from Congress.
B. Pending Legislation
Carcieri was decided during the latter part of the 110th congressional session, but no bills were presented to Congress for a legislative
fix during that session. However, during the 111th congressional session, three bills were introduced to address the problematic IRA language.234 The bills were separately introduced by Representatives
Tom Cole, Dale Kildee, and Senator Byron Dorgan.235 All three bills
failed to contain language ratifying and affirming previous trust acquisitions,236 but the bills proposed other similar changes in language: (1)
making the definitions of the IRA “effective beginning” on the date of
the enactment, (2) removing the limits created by “now under federal
jurisdiction” and replacing the language with “any federally recognized Indian tribe,” and (3) removing the definition for tribe and inserting an expansive definition of Indian tribe that includes any tribe
the Secretary acknowledges.237 Neither bill made it past being placed
on the legislative calendar.
230. Rice, supra note 79, at 594.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 594–95.
233. Id. at 595.
234. S. 1703, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3697, 111th Cong. (2009);
Cong. (2009) (all three bills have the same title, “To Reaffirm the
Secretary to Take Land Into Trust for Indians”).
235. S. 1703, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3697, 111th Cong. (2009);
Cong. (2009) (all three bills have the same title, “To Reaffirm the
Secretary to Take Land Into Trust for Indians”).
236. S. 1703, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3697, 111th Cong. (2009);
Cong. (2009); see also S. 676, 112th Cong. (2011).
237. S. 1703, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 3697, 111th Cong. (2010);
Cong. (2010).

H.R. 3742, 111th
Authority of the
H.R. 3742, 111th
Authority of the
H.R. 3742, 111th
H.R. 3742, 111th
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Three legislative bills were before the 112th Congress to amend the
IRA language.238 S. 676 proposed to amend the IRA by replacing the
language similar to the three bills in the 111th Congress, but this bill
included a ratification and confirmation of prior decisions to take land
into trust and would not affect existing federal laws or regulations relating to Indian tribes.239 This bill is known as the Akaka bill, as it was
introduced by Senator Akaka, and was unanimously approved by the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.240
H.R. 1291 was introduced by Representative Cole and proposed the
same language amendments as the bills in the 111th Congress, thus
the bill did not include language protecting or confirming prior landtrust decisions.241 This bill also included an Alaska-specific limitation,
making Alaska an exception to the Secretary’s discretion to put land
into trust, which is understandably opposed by Indian Nations.242
H.R. 1234, introduced by Representative Kildee, proposed amendments to the IRA language in the same way as the other two bills, but
also: (1) included ratification and confirmation of prior land-trust decisions, (2) would not have affected existing federal laws, and (3) does
not include an Alaska-specific provision.243 H.R. 1234 had thirty cosponsors.244 Neither bill of the 112th congressional session made it
past being placed on the legislative calendar.245
The 113th Congress has been even slower to present solutions to
the Carcieri problem.246 Representative Cole has made another attempt at corrective legislation with H.R. 279.247 But this bill replicates
the past bills proposed in the 111th Congress, which fails to firmly
protect the Secretary’s prior land acquisitions under the IRA.248 Cole
introduced this bill January 15, 2013, and the bill was referred to the
Subcommittee on Indian and Alaska Native Affairs. Recently, Representative Edward J. Markey introduced H.R. 666249 titled in a similar
fashion as H.R. 279: “to reaffirm the authority of the Secretary to take
land into trust for Indian tribes.”250 The bill was referred to the
House Committee on Natural Resources.251 H.R. 279 has ten co238. S. 676, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1291, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1234, 112th
Cong. (2011).
239. S. 676, 112th Cong. (2011).
240. Id.
241. H.R. 3697, 111th Cong. (2010).
242. Id.
243. H.R. 1234, 112th Cong. (2011).
244. Id.
245. S. 676, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1291, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1234, 112th
Cong. (2011).
246. H.R. 279 was not introduced until January 15, 2013 and H.R. 666 was introduced February 13, 2013.
247. H.R. 279, 113th Cong. (2013).
248. Id.
249. H.R. 666, 113th Cong. (2013).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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sponsors, including Representative Kildee.252 Following the pattern
of bills proposed each year and the failure to enact any one of eight
bills in the past three years, the likelihood of success for either of
these two bills during the 113th congressional session seems dim.
C. The Best Solution
Unfortunately, the best solution still resides with our slow-reacting
Congress. Considering alternative solutions proposed, tribes would
be left with: (1) unsecure land already taken in trust because of potential plaintiffs with prudential standing, (2) a questionable mechanism
for advancing tribal government and community, and (3) an unpredictable yet costly and timely process to get land taken into trust. As
courts have pontificated throughout history, only Congress has the authority to make federal Indian law; thus, a complete Carcieri/Patchak
fix must come from Congress.
Congress should approve a legislative bill proposing the same language as S. 676, which includes: (1) a modification of the problematic
language, as explained in the previous Section, (2) the ratification and
confirmation of the Secretary’s prior actions under the IRA, (3) express limits to the amendment to the IRA and no other federal Indian
law, except when laws specifically reference the IRA, and (4) a requirement that the Secretary provide a report assessing the Carcieri
effects on tribes, and a list detailing the tribes affected by Carcieri.
The repercussions of Carcieri demand the 113th Congress to provide
legislation clearly expressing the Secretary’s authority to take land
into trust to provide for Indians. Enacting a statute without all of this
provisional language will result in continued litigation and questioning
of the Secretary’s authority.
VI. CONCLUSION
Together, Carcieri and Patchak prevent tribes from seeking economic security under the IRA’s land-into-trust provision. These decisions have forced the Secretary and tribes to engage in costly and
timely historical research and litigation, which tribes can rarely afford.
The history of federal Indian law tells us Congress has a fiduciary duty
to Indians, and that Congress has the authority to empower or limit
tribal sovereignty. Thus, Congress has a duty to answer the question
of whether the Secretary has the authority to place land into trust for
Indian tribes that were federally recognized after 1934. To answer
this, Congress must enact a statute clearly expressing the authority of
the Secretary to take land into trust for all federally recognized Indian
tribes.
252. H.R. 279, 113th Cong. (2013).

